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Abstract 
Capital Juries and Objective Mitigation: Is Disagreement with Factually Asserted 
Mitigating Evidence Related to Ultimate Sentence Recommendation? 
Michael E. Keesler 
 
 
 
 
Determining precisely what type of mitigating evidence will spare a capital 
defendant from the death penalty is the hallmark of capital litigation defense.  That 
understanding has driven decades of research since the reemergence of the American 
death penalty in 1976, and it guides the actions of mitigation specialists.  Despite the 
procedural rule that juries must consider mitigating evidence presented and then decide 
whether to assign it any weight, anecdotal evidence suggests that this may not be 
uniformly practiced.  Rather, it is reportedly not uncommon for juries to disagree with 
mitigating factors that are essentially settled fact.  The proposed study sought to 
empirically explore (1) how common or uncommon that practice is; (2) whether that 
practice is related to the ultimate sentence recommendation of life or death; and (3) 
whether the effect on sentence recommendation increases linearly with the increasing 
number of disagreed-to facts.  Results indicated that (1) the practice may be more 
common than hypothesized; (2) when observed, disagreement with mitigators such as 
lack of significant criminal history or youth are significantly related to sentence 
recommendation; and (3) the effect may compound when multiple mitigators are 
considered together. 
  
1 
Introduction 
Since the revival of the death penalty in the United States in 1976, the procedures 
employed by the 37 death penalty jurisdictions have become largely uniform.  A capital 
defendant’s guilt will be examined by a death-qualified jury and, if he or she is found 
guilty, that jury will then balance mitigating against aggravating evidence before 
recommending a sentence of death or life (i.e., long-term imprisonment).  This procedure 
resulted from several key United States Supreme Court cases over the past 30+ years.   
Both legal scholars and social scientists have found the constant evolution of 
capital jurisprudence a fertile ground for discussion and research.  Although legal 
scholars may generally limit their investigation to the descriptive or proscriptive arenas, 
social scientists have conducted empirical research examining trends and patterns in 
capital sentencing.  The majority of these studies examine either broad trends (e.g., death 
qualified juries, the interaction of race and sentencing) or particularly effective evidence 
(e.g., specific mitigating factors typically well-received by juries.) 
Whereas many worthwhile analyses are self-evident to scholars and academics 
examining capital sentencing from afar, others arise out of observations made by 
practitioners working within the capital justice system.  One such observation subjected 
to empirical analysis in this project deals with capital jury treatment of factual mitigating 
evidence.  Stated another way, while most evidence presented to juries in capital cases 
could arguably be subjective or debatable, other evidence is presented by capital defense 
as settled fact.  Despite the nature of that evidence, practitioners have reported that it is 
not uncommon for capital juries to ignore it, as indicated by their disagreement with the 
statutory mitigating factors corresponding to that evidence.  Of greatest practical interest 
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is whether disagreement with mitigators of that asserted factual nature is related to 
sentence recommendation, which is the question empirically examined in this project. 
Background and Literature Summary 
The Modern Death Penalty Era in America 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court lifted the moratorium on capital 
punishment it had imposed 4 years earlier in Furman v. Georgia (1972).  With this ruling 
in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court identified in Georgia, Florida, and Texas a new 
framework for imposition of the death penalty that comports with the United States 
Constitution.  Still in effect today, the two broad requirements for state and federal capital 
penalty statutes to be constitutional are that: (1) objective criteria must be provided to 
both direct and limit sentencing discretion; and (2) the criteria must allow for a 
particularized consideration of the character and record of the convicted by the sentencer 
(Gregg v. Georgia, 1976).  These broad requirements are satisfied by what is now 
standard capital case procedure, hallmarked by a bifurcated trial.  In this two-part 
proceeding, the first phase focuses on the guilt of the accused, and the second (only 
following a finding of guilt) examines whether the capital defendant should be given the 
death penalty. 
The capital trial sentencing phase consists of defense and prosecution presenting 
evidence to the jury to encourage a recommendation of either imprisonment or death.  
The prosecution presents aggravating evidence in favor of the death penalty and, at the 
conclusion of its evidence (per Gregg v. Georgia, 1976), it must present to the jury at 
least one statutorily defined aggravating factor (see, e.g., Appendix A: North Carolina 
Statutorily Enumerated Aggravating Factors).  In counterbalance to the prosecution’s 
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aggravating evidence, the defense presents to the jury mitigating factors (see, e.g., 
Appendix B: North Carolina Statutorily Enumerated Mitigating Factors.)  Mitigating 
evidence is, as the name suggests, evidence that perhaps reduces the moral culpability of 
the defendant; not to excuse the defendant from guilt, but to reduce his or her subjective 
culpability and spare the defendant from the penalty reserved for the “worst of the worst” 
(Kansas v. Marsh, 2006, p. 206).  After all, as Justice Stewart simply put it, “Death is 
different…” (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 188, emphasis added). 
The intricacies of mitigation. 
Since Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Supreme Court has further clarified the 
intricate rules surrounding capital sentencing, mitigating evidence, and aggravating 
evidence.  For the most part, the Court has held that aggravating evidence must be limited 
lest the death penalty be inappropriately applied.  This includes, for example, the 
requirement that aggravating factors qualifying a defendant for the death penalty be 
statutorily defined (Gregg, but see Zant v. Stephens, 1983).  At the same time, however, 
these factors can exist either for ex-ante consideration in the definition of the offense 
itself, or for ex-post consideration during the sentencing phase (Lowenfield v. Phelps, 
1988). 
In contrast to decisions limiting aggravating evidence, a separate string of 
decisions has increased the potential scope of mitigation and flexibility with which 
defense may pursue and present mitigating evidence.  The most fundamental of these 
cases came only 2 years after Gregg v. Georgia (1976), with the Supreme Court ruling in 
Lockett v. Ohio (1978) that an Ohio statute barring the introduction of certain mitigating 
evidence was unconstitutional.  Expanding on that conclusion, and perhaps put best by 
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Justice Burger: “[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the 
sentencer…not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death” (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978, p. 
604).  Thus, Lockett (1978) stands today for the principle that the scope of mitigation is 
extremely broad.   
Despite Justice Burger’s characterization that nearly anything is allowable in 
mitigation, the Supreme Court has occasionally had to make specific rulings which, 
almost unanimously, identify specific allowable evidence.  Over time, this list would 
come to include non-statutorily defined mitigating evidence (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978; 
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 1987), testimony regarding the defendant’s pre-adjudication 
incarcerated behavior (Skipper v. South Carolina, 1986), or even sheer sympathy felt for 
the defendant (Saffle v. Parks, 1990).  Really the only limit seems to be judicial patience 
in cases of cavalier defense counsel, though judges likely shy away from questionable 
rulings that could be grounds for appeal.   
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lockett (1978), some confusion still 
existed among the states when it came to the expansiveness of mitigation.  In 1982, the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed a case from Oklahoma in which a holdout juror 
declined to agree with any of the mitigating evidence.  Therein, the jury had thus thought 
itself unable to assign any of the mitigating evidence weight in its sentencing decision.  In 
overturning the death sentence, the Court explained that “failure to consider all of the 
mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence, in plain violation of 
Lockett, [and] it is our duty to remand this case for resentencing” (Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
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1982, p. 117).  The Eddings (1982) decision was further clarified by the Supreme Court’s 
later explanation that misapplication of this rule by the jury, be it due to the their 
misinterpretation of the court’s instructions (Mills v. Maryland, 1988) or misleading of 
the jury by the court (McKoy v. North Carolina, 1990), will result in the case being 
remanded for resentencing.  Thus the combined effect of Lockett (1978), Eddings (1982), 
and their progeny was that all mitigation may be submitted to the jury, and the jury may 
holistically assign any of the evidence weight regardless of its level of agreement with it. 
The interaction of mitigation, aggravation, and sentence. 
 In 2002, the United States Supreme Court concluded in Ring v. Arizona that, for a 
sentence of death, the jury must find the presence of at least one aggravating factors and 
also that the presence of any mitigating factors does not outweigh the aggravating 
evidence.  At the same time, though, Florida’s statutory framework has continued to 
survive constitutional challenge –allowing a judge to impose a sentence of death 
following a jury’s finding of sufficient aggravating evidence, albeit recommending life 
(Spaziano v. Florida, 1984; West's F.S.A. § 921.141, 2010).  Additionally, it is also 
constitutionally permissible for a state statute to mandate a sentence of death upon a 
finding of at least one aggravating factor and the absence of any mitigating factors 
(Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 1990).  Thus it is arguably important for capital defense to 
ensure damage control of aggravating evidence (per Spaziano), and to ensure that the jury 
will agree with at least one of the mitigating factors presented to it (per Blystone). 
Procedural considerations. 
Aggravating and mitigating evidence, narrowly tailored on the one hand and fairly 
open-ended on the other, may be presented to the jury in the form of eyewitness accounts, 
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character evidence or witnesses, expert analysis, victim impact evidence, and many other 
ways.  At the conclusion of the presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence 
during the sentencing phase, the judge instructs the jury on how it should make a 
recommendation of life or death.  In North Carolina (which is the focus of the current 
study), following those instructions, the prosecution and defense must supply the jury 
with written lists of aggravating and mitigating factors, which the jury may then reference 
in deliberation.  At the conclusion of its deliberation, and upon its recommendation of life 
or death, the jury returns those documents to the court reflecting its agreement or 
disagreement with the aggravating and mitigating evidence.  (These forms are of 
particular relevance to this study and will be referenced later.)  
 Extant Literature on Mitigation and the Death Penalty 
The still-growing body of United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the 
death penalty is matched by a comparably massive amount of literature and commentary 
on the subject published in the last several decades.  This probably comes as no surprise 
due to the highly emotional nature of the subject, its noted correlation with traditional 
political lines, and the hard-line views that many Americans take on the subject.  
Although an exhaustive review of the literature is logistically prohibitive, some general 
themes and trends are worth noting.  Importantly, this section will also explain how the 
current proposed study fits into that framework. 
The literature on the death penalty in America can be placed into four categories.  
The first category is descriptive literature, which attempts to explain the rules in place for 
death penalty proceedings and how they all work together in a larger procedural context.  
The second category is experimental literature, mostly authored by American social 
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scientists, which examines patterns and trends in capital jurisprudence.  The third 
category is archival research based on analysis of actual capital case data.  The fourth 
category is proscriptive literature, which attempts to synthesize the descriptive and 
experimental literature to produce a range of recommendations for how capital penalty 
procedure in America should change.  One could argue that a fifth and overlooked 
category is philosophical literature, which refers to books and articles that take a firm 
stance either in favor of or in opposition to the death penalty.  Because much of that 
literature is grounded in political or deontological values, though, it exists outside the 
scope of this present examination.  
Descriptive literature. 
The descriptive literature is probably the largest of the four categories because 
individuals from both the social science and legal communities have been major 
contributors.  The descriptive literature includes, for example, historical reviews and 
descriptions of the evolution of death penalty procedure in America (e.g., Banner, 2002).  
Many of these articles and books discuss the evolution of capital punishment in terms of 
an English/American tradition (Paternoster, 1991) or more broadly as a human 
phenomenon (Duntley & Shackleford, 2008).  More pointed are simpler descriptive 
pieces that explain the rules and procedure pertaining to death penalty litigation 
(Mandery, 2005), which range from straightforward factual books (e.g., Streib, 2005) to 
more detailed analyses of specific aspects of death penalty practice (Wyda & Black, 
1989).    
Another type of descriptive literature might address the death penalty within a 
certain framework or through a particular lens.  This might have to do with offender 
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characteristics, such as race (Allen & Clubb, 2008), gender (O’Shea, 1999), or age 
(Lewis et al., 1988).  Others address the role of certain professional players like forensic 
psychiatrists (Leong, 1993), forensic mental health experts (Fabian, 2003), mitigation 
specialists or consultants (Dennis, 2000), or attorneys defending those accused of a 
capital offense (McPherson, 1995).  Still other works take the more lay perspective of 
families of those accused of capital offenses (Sharp, 2005) or those working closely with 
the accused (Prejean, 1993), and some have even taken the perspective of the accused or 
convicted themselves (Robertson, 2002; Stetler et al., 2001).    
Another variety of descriptive literature discusses the death penalty in light of a 
particular case or set of cases (Beszterczey, 2007; Romeo, 2006; Singh, 2006; Spain & 
Schmedlen, 2005).  A final body of descriptive literature is more oriented toward those 
working in the field.  For example, Goldstein et al. (2006) address the importance of 
childhood trauma in the lives of those defendants convicted of a capital offense and 
facing the death penalty.  More recently, Kaser-Boyd (2008) explained how a revival of 
the Rorschach in a forensic context could be used to demonstrate impairment or deficits 
in those convicted of capital offenses. 
Experimental literature. 
Although somewhat less expansive than the descriptive literature, a great deal of 
experimental research has been devoted to capital sentencing, with a particular focus on 
mitigation.  Several generalizations can be made about this experimental literature.  First, 
the overwhelming majority of it is based on controlled studies conducted with mock 
jurors (e.g., Haney & Lynch, 1994; Butler, 2007); very little is based on archival research 
(c.f. Beck and Shumsky, 1997).  Second, many of the studies deal with broad concepts 
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like death-qualification (Butler & Moran, 2007) or the interaction of race and sentencing 
(Brewer, 2004).  Last, the studies that do look at specific mitigating factors are each 
necessarily limited to only a few specific factors (e.g., Barnett et al., 2004, 2007).  The 
combined effect of these three limitations is a significant gap in the understanding of how 
mitigating factors act and interact to produce a particular sentence recommendation.   
Social scientists have been examining patterns in death penalty decisions ever 
since the 1976 Supreme Court decision restoring the death penalty as a potential sentence 
in America (Gregg v. Georgia).  One of the first major studies, by Luginbuhl and 
Middendorf (1988), found that jurors strongly opposed to the death penalty are 
significantly more receptive to mitigating factors than jurors unopposed to capital 
punishment.  Ten years later, Stephen P. Garvey and the Capital Jury Project found that 
residual doubt of a defendant’s guilt and the age of the defendant were significant 
mitigating factors, with some indications that evidence of psychological or psychosocial 
factors might also mitigate (Garvey, 1998).  Several years later, another controlled 
experiment looking at the efficacy of different mitigating factors found that juries are less 
likely to recommend death in light of evidence of mental illness, intoxication at the time 
of the offense, or a history of abuse (Barnett et al., 2004).  That same study also found 
that juries are more likely to recommend death in the complete absence of any mitigating 
evidence. 
Death qualification is a hurdle that all capital jurors must clear, and something 
with which many social scientists take issue.  In short, during jury selection, if the trial 
has the potential to become a capital case, the court must confirm that each juror is “death 
qualified,” meaning that he or she is not categorically opposed to the death penalty, and 
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that he or she could cast a vote for the death sentence.  Recently, Butler and Moran 
(2007) investigated inter alia the impact of death qualification on jurors’ receptivity to 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  Their analysis of 212 venirepersons indicated that 
death-qualified jurors are more likely to demonstrate higher endorsement of aggravating 
factors and lower endorsements of both non-statutory and statutory mitigating factors 
(Butler & Moran, 2007).  In another study, death-qualified mock jurors were found more 
likely to render a guilty verdict than jurors who would have been excluded for inability to 
be death qualified (Butler, 2007).  Despite these and similar findings, the Supreme Court 
has consistently held, beginning with Lockhart v. McCree (1986), that even in light of 
such evidence, it is still constitutionally permissible to require the use of death-qualified 
juries.  As Lockhart (1986) has yet to be overturned, despite indications that the process 
of selecting a death-qualified jury may bias the jury in favor of the prosecution, the 
Supreme Court has upheld the process as constitutional. 
Like death-qualified juries, jury instructions are another broad concept that have 
been the target of controlled research.  For example, in a controlled study with 491 
undergraduates, mock jurors were thrice instructed on how to reach a sentence in a 
capital case (i.e., aggravating evidence, mitigating evidence, discussion, and 
recommendation of death only if at least one statutorily defined aggravating factor is 
found and it is not outweighed by mitigating evidence).  Despite having been instructed 
three times, the participants showed highly variable ability to even define aggravating 
and mitigating evidence, let alone in how they apply the rules in making a sentence 
recommendation (Haney & Lynch, 1994).  These findings were supported by Wiener’s 
(1998) mock jury study, which found that following jury instructions, participants 
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showed low accuracy for both of the Gregg v. Georgia (1976) requirements.  Analyses 
also indicated a troublesome negative correlation between accuracy and recommendation 
of the death penalty (Wiener, 1998).   
Other studies have focused more pointedly on mitigating evidence.  For example, 
in a recent experiment, Barnett et al. (2007) used hypothetical scenarios presented to 
undergraduate mock jurors to gauge the impact of different mitigating evidence in capital 
sentencing.  They found that evidence of mental retardation, history of hospitalization for 
mental illness, lack of criminal record, history of major head injuries, schizophrenia 
(specifically), and a history of childhood physical or sexual abuse had the most mitigating 
effect in capital sentencing (Barnett et al., 2007).  Furthermore, despite their common 
appearance among statutorily enumerated mitigating factors, and some of the earlier 
findings by Barnett et al. (2004), they found that evidence of alcohol or drug dependence, 
or evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense, actually had an 
aggravating effect (Barnett et al., 2004, 2007). 
Yet another controlled study examined the effectiveness of both type and quantity 
of mitigating factors presented to the jury.  Tetterton and Brodsky (2007) found that an 
extended period of childhood abuse is associated with elevated juror compassion, 
inherently linked with mitigating value.  They also found that the sheer volume of 
mitigating circumstances presented to the jury seemed to be positively associated with 
perception of mitigating value by the jury, confirming and expanding on the Barnett et al. 
(2004) study that found higher recommendations of death in the absence of mitigating 
evidence (Tetterton & Brodsky, 2007).  This has since been clarified by more recent 
research, which found that the higher rates of jury agreement with mitigating evidence 
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are significantly related to more life sentences in at least one death penalty state (Keesler 
et al., 2010).  That finding suggests that past juries overwhelmed with attenuated or 
“longshot” mitigating factors were actually less likely to recommend a life sentence. 
Although this discussion of the extant literature is not exhaustive, it incorporates 
the most noteworthy studies and illustrates some of the generalizations and limitations 
mentioned earlier.  The majority of the studies are controlled experiments rather than 
archival analyses of real capital case data.  Perhaps as a function of that, studies typically 
focus either on broad concepts (e.g., death-qualification) or on a select few sources of 
mitigation (e.g., abuse, drugs, mental illness), while the number of studies addressing 
broad-spectrum mitigation is more modest. 
Archival research literature. 
By far the smallest body of literature on mitigating factors or capital sentencing, 
archival research is different from experimental research because its analyses are based 
on historical case data rather than controlled studies.  Different investigative approaches 
come with their respective advantages and disadvantages.  Though archival research 
makes it impossible to infer causality due to lack of experimental control, researchers can 
argue that its findings are more reliable and generalizeable.   
Only one publicly available archival analysis is related to the current proposed 
project.  Beck and Shumsky (1997) examined data from 606 capital cases in Georgia 
beginning in the 1970s.  By comparing the details of each case to the jury’s 
recommendation of life or death, they found that a recommendation of death was 
significantly more likely than life in two scenarios: with court-appointed counsel, 
controlling for the defendant’s character and circumstances of the crime; and when the 
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victim was Caucasian, of high social status, or a stranger to the defendant (Beck & 
Shumsky, 1997). 
Proscriptive literature. 
By combining the Supreme Court case law with social science literature on capital 
sentencing, proscriptive literature on the death penalty makes observations and 
recommendations for the future.  Contributed to by legal scholars, social scientists, and a 
cross-discipline of practitioners, this growing body of literature makes suggestions to 
practitioners and law-makers alike about the future of the death penalty in America.  
While some might argue that such an exercise is purely academic, the continually 
increasing involvement of academics and experts in courtrooms and legislative floors 
suggests otherwise. 
 Both the American Psychological Association and American Psychiatric 
Association have published ethical standards to which their respective members must 
adhere (American Psychological Association, 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 
2009).  Additionally, both the Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic 
Psychologists (1991) (from Division 41 of the American Psychological Association) and 
the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (1995) have published ethical 
guidelines specifically targeted at those working in a forensic context.  Nonetheless, 
ethical guidelines provide the floor for acceptable conduct, and do little to illuminate 
what best practices are or ought to be, or if there is any legally enforceable standard of 
care (see Heilbrun et al., 2008, for a discussion of the differences, both ethical and legal, 
among standards of practice, standards of care, and best practices). 
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In 2003, Marczyk et al. provided a model referral, report, and consideration of 
potential mitigators that practitioners can follow in their process of investigating, 
collecting, and presenting mitigating evidence in capital cases.  In 2008, Marczyk et al. 
supplemented and updated this to provide practitioners with a principles-based approach 
to conducting capital case mitigation evaluations.  Most recently, the Best Practices in 
Forensic Mental Health Assessment series by Oxford University Press has released 
guidelines for conducting capital sentencing, combining a succinct legal and scientific 
overview with specific practitioner guidelines, spanning from preparation for the 
evaluation to testimony (Cunningham, 2010). 
Social scientists cannot personally affect change via a court ruling or legislative 
action, but they can be agents of that change with the work they do, the research they 
publish, and the way they conduct themselves in capital cases.  Although principles-based 
approaches and best-practice standards are aspirational and likely fall above the standard 
of care (Heilbrun et al., 2008), the American Psychological Association and American 
Psychiatric Association, in concert with state licensing boards, can always raise the bar 
on minimally accepted standards in the future.  Studies like the one being proposed 
herein that contribute to the extant literature on the topic are helpful to inform 
practitioners and policymakers alike, and make recommendations directly or indirectly as 
to the prudence of current practice. 
Rationale for the Present Study 
The present study sought to address some of the many questions left unanswered 
by the relevant research and controlled studies on the subject of mitigation in capital 
sentencing.  Although the extant literature provides some insight into the efficacy of a 
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few particular mitigating factors, and shows general trends among juries in response to 
mitigating evidence, there is still an absence of large-scale archival studies.    
The database that this thesis analyzed consists of 369 North Carolina capital cases 
spanning over a decade.  The goals of this ongoing project, of which this thesis comprises 
only one piece, are to isolate particularly potent mitigating factors (potent in the sense 
that they lead juries to recommend life rather than death), identify particularly effective 
constellations of mitigating factors, find trends or patterns in the specific mitigating 
factors that are presented to North Carolina juries, examine the quantities of factors 
presented and any interaction between quantity and quality or accuracy of those factors, 
and examine if the efficacy of mitigating factors presented to the jury interacts with or is 
affected by characteristics of the defendant or the crime.   
The major analysis undertaken herein examined a peculiar trend described by the 
database’s architect.  Specifically, despite the fact that a variety of mitigating factors 
provided to juries are presented by defense counsel as settled fact, it is not uncommon for 
juries to disagree with even those factors.  Dr. Laughon explained that she was always 
surprised when juries disagreed with or failed to find such mitigators, and she wondered 
whether such treatment was a proxy for a death sentence.  Fortunately for this analysis, it 
was possible to examine each juries’ treatment of each mitigator with which they were 
presented; when North Carolina juries return sentencing recommendations to the judge, 
they document which mitigating factors they found/agreed with, which they did not, and 
their recommended sentence of life or death (on the forms, see supra).   
The aforementioned observation begs the question why some juries do this.  
Haney and Lynch (1994) might speculate that these juries misunderstood the instructions 
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given to them.  More cynically, Butler and Moran (2007) might say that these death-
qualified juries are pro-prosecution, paying little attention to the mitigating evidence and 
what they are supposed to do with it.  The former explanation would be supported by 
findings of no relationship between disagreement and sentence recommendation, while 
the latter would be supported by findings that disagreement more often occurs with death 
sentences.  This database offered the opportunity to empirically investigate this trend 
before arriving at any tentative conclusion. 
The practical implications of answering this question would be layered: First, if a 
significant relationship appeared between disagreeing with factually asserted mitigators 
and sentence recommendation, then one could rationalize that the trend is not strictly due 
to jury misinterpretation of instructions.  Second, if disagreement with those mitigators 
was found to be associated with death sentences, then a variety of somewhat distressing 
conclusions could be drawn about the way capital juries are weighing mitigating evidence 
– namely that in some cases they may not be weighing mitigating evidence at all.  That 
fascinating but troubling finding would segue perfectly into a future planned analysis for 
this ongoing project, examining whether a “magic formula” of aggravation exists that, 
regardless of mitigating factors, will produce a recommended death sentence.  Also, there 
would be practical implications for practicing defense counsel; namely that while past 
analysis has suggested a danger of overbreadth, a similar danger may be posed by 
overdepth (if done at the expense of scope). 
Hypotheses 
Based on a synthesis of the extant literature, theory, and anecdotal evidence, the 
hypotheses for the present analysis were four-fold:   
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(1) Instances wherein juries disagree with objective mitigating evidence are 
comparably common to instances wherein they disagree.  
(2) Jury disagreement with factually asserted mitigating factors is significantly 
related to a recommended death sentence.   
(3) As disagreement increases across multiple factual mitigating factors, so too 
does the effect size of the relationship between disagreement and death 
sentence.   
(4) The aforementioned relationship will hold when additional demographic 
variables are added to the analysis. 
Method 
The Database 
The database under examination consisted of 369 capital cases from North 
Carolina.  The cases span from 1982 to 1998, and the collection was created by coding 
every capital case in print at the Wake Forest University Law Library during that time-
frame.  Due to that comprehensive coding practice, it is expected that the database 
includes representative defendants from a variety of occupations, religions, ethnicities, 
ages, and socioeconomic backgrounds.   
Data Collection 
The 369-case database was collected by Dr. Pamela Laughon and a variety of her 
students over a number of years.  Dr. Laughon, a North Carolina-based psychologist who 
specializes in mitigation consultation, began the data collection as an exploration of how 
mitigation profiles looked across North Carolina capital cases.  All of the data were 
pulled from publicly accessible documents in the Wake Forest University Law Library.  
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Though the moratorium on the death penalty was lifted by the Supreme Court 1976, she 
began with 1982 cases because no earlier were available at the library.   
By pulling one hard-copy case off of the shelves at a time, Dr. Laughon and her 
research assistants gradually expanded the database to its current size.  Pertinent 
documents (e.g., jury sentencing forms) were photocopied and retained for Dr. Laughon’s 
personal records.  Collectively, she and her students worked their way forward from 1982 
cases, continuing to examine every North Carolina capital case in hard copy format at the 
Wake Forest University Law Library.  As they went, Dr. Laughon also coded variables of 
interest electronically into Microsoft Access.  
Today, in its current state of completion, the database contains a wide variety of 
variables. These include demographic data on the defendants (e.g., race, gender, age), 
numerous variables based on the case-in-chief (e.g., dates of arrest, trial, and verdict; 
offense characteristics; victim characteristics; whether the defendant was the direct cause 
of death), and a thorough coding of sentencing phase variables (e.g., number, type, 
composition, and language of mitigating factors).  The main variables of interest for this 
study were the mitigating factors presented to the jury, the jury’s response to each 
individual factor, and the sentence recommendations.  Data necessary for the planned 
analyses (see infra) were drawn from the Microsoft Access Database using its Query® 
function, then transferred into SPSS for statistical analysis. 
Mitigating Factors of Particular Interest 
 As mentioned earlier, mitigating factors presented to juries can either be 
statutorily defined or created by capital defense on a case-by-case basis.  As one might 
imagine, factors that appear in the North Carolina statutory framework are generally 
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more straightforward.  Arguably, the first eight factors (all but factor 9: “Any other 
circumstance.”) are also fairly objective.  In other words, they are either applicable or not, 
and in many cases it is hard to imagine that the factor is debatable.  Of those 8, though, 3 
are of a particularly factual nature, leaving little room for disagreement when applicable.  
Treatment of these three factors by juries constituted the thrust of this analysis.  These 
three statutorily defined factors are: f(1), “The defendant has no significant history of 
prior criminal activity”; f(7), “The defendant’s age at the time of the murder”; and f(8), 
“The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified truthfully 
for the state in another prosecution of a felony” (see also Appendix B: North Carolina 
Statutorily Enumerated Mitigating Factors). 
Results 
Demographic and descriptive analysis. 
Preliminary analysis of the data looked at basic demographic and descriptive data 
of the cases. From the 369 cases coded in the Microsoft Access Database, variables 
drawn using the Query® function and imported to SPSS included: date of arrest, 
defendant’s age at time of the arrest, gender, race, plea, the jury’s response to North 
Carolina Statutorily Defined Mitigating Factors 1, 7, and 8 (if applicable; i.e., if those 
factors were presented in a given case), and the jury’s ultimate sentence recommendation.  
Those variables constituted the working dataset from which subsequent analyses were 
run.  Preliminary basic descriptive and demographic statistics were run on all 369 cases.  
Cases in the dataset ranged from 1982 to 1998.  In terms of race/ethnicity, 175 
defendants were Black, 174 were White, 12 were Native American, 4 were Hispanic, 3 
were multi-racial, and 1 was Asian.  During the guilt phase, 342 pled not guilty (27 
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guilty).  Defendant age ranged from 14 to 68 years (M=30.50, SD=8.50).  Breaking the 
cases down by gender, 356 of the defendants were male (13 female).  Lastly, in 223 of 
the cases, the jury returned a death sentence (146 life sentences).  In those 369 cases, 
mitigating factor f(1) [no significant criminal history] was put forth 202 times, f(7) [age 
at time of offense] was put forth 166 times, and f(8) [aided prosecution] was put forth 30 
times. 
Anecdotal pattern versus general trend. 
The first analysis examined Hypothesis 1: Instances wherein juries disagree with 
objective mitigating evidence are comparably common to instances wherein they 
disagree.  As already mentioned, anecdotal evidence suggests that such practice is not 
uncommon.  To establish that the frequency of disagreement with established mitigating 
factors significantly differs from frequency of agreement, one would conduct a traditional 
significance test.  For this analysis, however, and based on Dr. Laughon’s description of 
capital sentencing practice, it was hypothesized that the number of instances wherein 
juries disagree with these factors would be roughly comparable to instances wherein they 
agree. Thus the hypothesis tested was that the frequency of those dichotomous 
approaches is not significantly different.   
In statistical terms, this was an exercise in accepting the null hypothesis (Frick, 
1995).  Accepting the null hypothesis is conceptually challenging because, in logical 
reasoning terms, it feels like a mistaken inferential reversal (i.e., concluding that failure 
to find a relationship necessarily indicates an absence thereof).  However, Frick (1995) 
explains that upon satisfaction of three criteria, the null hypothesis can be accepted: (1) 
the null hypothesis should be plausible; (2) results should be consistent with the null 
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hypothesis; and (3) a “good effort” should have been made to find an effect (p. 137).  
Regarding the plausibility of the null hypothesis, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
disagreement with factually asserted mitigation is not uncommon.  Results of any 
analysis have to be evaluated at the appropriate juncture, but some planning could be 
done regarding the “good effort” to be undertaken – namely, requiring that any measured 
difference was far from statistical significance (i.e., p > .20) 
From the working dataset, every instance in which North Carolina Statutory 
Factors 1, 7, or 8 were submitted to the jury were examined, and the jury’s responses to 
those factors were tabulated.  Because statutory factors are more uniformly submitted 
than other factors by virtue of their already having been drafted, it was correctly 
anticipated that there would be many instances of these factors submitted to North 
Carolina juries, and thus the N for this analysis would be sufficiently large.  The two 
tabulations (instances of agreement vs. instances of disagreement) were compared using a 
Chi-square goodness of fit test.   
Analysis suggested that disagreement with counsel’s factually asserted mitigators 
may be even more common than hypothesized; χ2 (1, N = 396) = 3.273, p = .07.  Of the 
396 instances where mitigating factors f(1), f(7), and f(8) were observed, 180 instances 
were found to have mitigating value, whereas 216 were not (see Table 1).  Again, the 
hypothesis was that the latter would sufficiently approach the former so as to produce no 
significant difference.  In actuality, though, instances of disagreement exceeded instances 
of agreement.  Moreover the margin was large enough so as to preclude acceptance of the 
null hypothesis, as the observed difference failed to surmount the p > .20 cutoff.  
However, whereas the null hypothesis is not supported by these findings, they very nearly 
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produced a statistically significant difference based on a traditional p < .05 benchmark.  
Though not hypothesized, the analysis nearly suggested that objectively asserted 
mitigators are significantly more likely to be rejected than accepted. 
Whether disagreement with factual mitigation relates to sentence recommendation. 
While the former analysis was designed to empirically support Dr. Laughon’s 
observation, its practical implications would nonetheless have been limited.  Finding that 
ignoring of factually asserted mitigation bears on sentence recommendation, though, 
would have practical implications.  This second analysis examined Hypothesis 2: Jury 
disagreement with factually established mitigating factors is significantly related to a 
recommended death sentence.  Stated another way, recommended sentence (life versus 
death) is related to the jury’s response (agreement or disagreement) with factual 
mitigating factors presented.  Simply put, it was expected that juries in disagreement with 
factually based mitigating factors more often recommend death sentences than life 
imprisonment. 
This hypothesis was tested using Chi-square tests for independence.  From the 
working SPSS dataset, each of the three factors under investigation was independently 
evaluated.  For a given factor, each time it was presented, the jury’s reaction (agree or 
disagree) was counted. Those two totals were then compared to the jury’s 
recommendation of life or death in those cases using a chi-square test for independence.  
Ultimately in that fashion, three 2 x 2 Chi-square tests for independence (one for each 
factor) were used to analyze whether agreement with factually asserted mitigation is 
related to sentence recommendation.  Because three significance tests were  
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run, with a fourth and fifth to follow for the main hypotheses (see infra), a Bonferroni 
Correction was utilized to compensate for the inflated risk of a Type I error. Specifically, 
rather than setting p at the traditional .05 cutoff for significance, p was set at .01 (β = α 
/ n = .05 / 5 = .01).  Following significance testing, Phi coefficients were also calculated 
for each of the three tests.  The Phi coefficients are measures of effect size designed to 
help illuminate the comparative practical significance of jury reaction to each standalone 
factor. 
Agreement with f(1) [no significant criminal history] 
Analysis indicates that agreement with statutory mitigating factor f(1) [no 
significant criminal history] was significantly related to sentence, χ2 = 19.522, p < .001, 
Φ = .311 [medium effect size (Cohen, 1988)].  Of the 202 observed cases where defense 
counsel asserted that the defendant lacked a significant criminal history, 69 juries agreed 
and recommended a sentence of life, 53 agreed but recommended a sentence of death, 20 
disagreed but recommended life, and 60 disagreed and recommended death (see Table 2).  
This suggests that, as hypothesized, jury agreement with the factual assertion that the 
defendant lacks a criminal history was significantly related to their ultimate sentence 
recommendation; agreement was significantly more likely to accompany a recommended 
life sentences, and disagreement was significantly more likely to accompany a 
recommended death sentence. 
Agreement with f(7) [age at time of the offense] 
Analysis indicates that jury agreement with statutory mitigator f(7) [age at the 
time of the offense] was significantly related to ultimate sentence recommendation, χ2 = 
12.103, p < .001, Φ = .270 [small effect size (Cohen, 1988)].  Of the 166 cases where 
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defense counsel asserted the objective mitigator of the defendant’s age at the time of the 
offense, 25 juries agreed and recommended life, 11 agreed but recommended death, 48 
disagreed but still recommended life, and 82 disagreed and recommended death (see 
Table 3).  These findings support the hypothesis that jury agreement with the objectively 
asserted mitigator f(7) was significantly related to ultimate sentence recommendation, 
with agreement significantly associated with life sentences, and disagreement 
significantly associated with death sentences. 
One obvious issue with including age as a factually asserted mitigator is the 
absence of any defined cutoff.  The above analysis examining all instances of f(7) 
agreement and disagreement inherently presupposes that the factor was used 
appropriately (i.e., when the defendant was young or old).  Challenging that supposition 
with closer examination could reveal that the effect of f(7) agreement is stronger than 
suggested above when appropriately advocated.  The decision on where to set the cutoff, 
though, is without any clear guidance.   
The two traditional benchmarks for the transition from youth to adulthood in the 
United States are probably at ages 18 (e.g., voting right, eligibility for military service, 
ability to buy tobacco, pornography, and gamble in certain jurisdictions) or 21 (full rights 
of adults, i.e. alcohol purchase and consumption).  The age of 25 years also carries 
certain legal rights (e.g., reduction in insurance premiums, ablility to rent a car or home 
in certain jurisdictions), but many individuals would likely consider an individual to be a 
full-fledged adult before age 25.  The commonality amongst those milestones is that each 
incorporates important decision making - an ability adults are thought to possess while 
juveniles and adolescents are not.  Nonetheless, the age of full-fledged "adult decision 
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making" remains somewhat elusive.  Looking to the literature, neuropsychological testing 
and research conducted in the last decade suggests that the prefrontal cortex, utilized in 
mature decision making (Braver & Barch, 2002; Goldman-Rakic & Leung, 2002; 
Krawczyk, 2002), may continue development into young adulthood (Hooper et al., 2004; 
Mukherjee et al., 2002; Paus et al., 2001; Sowell, Thompson, Tessner, & Toga, 2001).  
The advent and utilization of functional neuroimaging has lent further support to these 
findings (Bunge, Dudovic, Thomason,Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002; Casey, Giedd, & 
Thomas, 2000; Kwon, Reiss, & Menon, 2002) .  That said, the transition from youth to 
adulthood, whenever that may be, does not necessarily coincide with the time at which 
age is no longer a viable mitigating factor.  In light of this uncertainty, observed 
frequencies in the dataset were examined for what might appear to be any natural breaks 
in jury treatment of age as a mitigating factor (see Table 4). 
From the dataset, it was possible to calculate each defendant's age at the time of 
arrest based on the recorded arrest date and the defendant's date of birth.  Whereas using 
age at the time of offense would have been ideal, that information was not available for 
all cases - thus age at time of arrest was used as a proxy.  Examination of agreement with 
factor f(7) broken down by the age of the defendant at the time of arrest reveals two 
natural breaks: 27 years and 19 years.  In the case of the former, a convicted defendant 
who was 27 years old at the time of  arrest was the oldest whose jury concluded his age 
was of mitigating value.  In the case of the latter, it was only in cases of 19-year-old 
defendants and younger that juries more often than not agreed that age was of mitigating 
value.  Two analyses mirroring that which looked at all instances of f(7) were conducted, 
one examining only cases of f(7) with defendants aged 27 or younger and one examining 
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only cases with defendants aged 19 and younger.  The hope was that these could help 
further illuminate the main analyses undertaken and the relationship between agreement 
with f(7) and sentence recommendation. 
When limiting the analysis to these more applicable cases in which the defendant 
was aged 27 or younger, analysis indicates that jury agreement with mitigator f(7) was 
significantly related to ultimate sentence recommendation, χ2 = 10.844, p =  .001, Φ = 
.281 [small effect size (Cohen, 1988)].  Of the 137 cases where defense counsel more 
applicably asserted the objective mitigator of the defendant’s age, 25 juries agreed and 
recommended life, 10 agreed but recommended death, 40 disagreed but still 
recommended life, and 62 disagreed and recommended death.  These findings similarly 
support the hypothesis that jury agreement with objectively asserted mitigator f(7) was 
significantly related to ultimate sentence recommendation.  When limiting the analysis to 
“applicable” cases (i.e., aged 27 or younger by arrest), a slightly larger effect size was 
observed (Φ = .281 versus Φ = .270) than when including all instances of f(7) 
presentation.  
When limiting the analysis still further to perhaps the “most applicable” cases, or 
those in which the defendant was 19 or younger at the time of arrest, analysis failed to 
find a significant relationship between  agreement with f(7) and sentence 
recommendation, χ2 = 2.274, p = .132, Φ = .285.  Of the 28 defendants age 19 or under at 
the time of arrest whose attorneys asserted f(7), 14 juries agreed and recommended life, 5 
agreed but recommended death, 4 disagreed but still recommended life, and 5 disagreed 
and recommended death (see Table 6).  This analysis may have failed to find significance 
due to the reduced number of observed cases.  Specifically, whereas a stark contrast was 
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observed between recommended life and death sentences in cases of agreement with f(7) 
(14 versus 5), no such contrast was present in cases of disagreement (4 versus 5).  With 
more observed cases, that contrast may have emerged.  On the other hand, a more 
parsimonious explanation would simply recognize that, where juries agreed that the 
defendant's youth was of mitigating value, they were more likely to recommend life; 
where juries disagreed that youth mitigated, that conclusion was simply not predictive of 
sentence recommendation.  Thus the takeaway conclusion may be that dichotomous 
treatment of f(7) as a factually asserted mitigator may not relate to sentence 
recommendation, but jury agreement with the mitigating value of youth may.  
Nonetheless, despite a failure to find significance, the effect size was again slightly larger 
when limiting the cases to an arguably more applicable age range (Age 19 Φ = .285 > 
Age 27 Φ = .281 > All Cases Φ = .270).  Thus, in light of these three comparative 
analysis examining the relationship between f(7) agreement and sentence 
recommendation, one may tentatively conclude that agreement was significantly 
associated with life sentences, and the likelihood of a jury agreeing increased linearly as 
the defendant’s age decreased – as too did the practical effect of that agreement or its 
bearing on the sentencing recommendation. 
Agreement with f(8) [aided prosecution] 
Analysis indicated that jury agreement with statutory mitigator f(8) [aided 
prosecution] was not significantly related to sentence, χ2 = .151, p = .515, Φ = .071 [small 
effect size (Cohen, 1988)].  Of the 30 cases where defense counsel asserted the objective 
mitigator that the defendant aided the prosecution, 8 juries agreed and recommended life, 
15 agreed but recommended death, 3 disagreed but recommended life, and 4 disagreed 
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and recommended death (see Table 7).  This analysis may again have been underpowered 
due to the scarcity of f(8) instances in the dataset, or in capital litigation for that matter.  
However, unlike with the previous analysis examining age, herein the frequency counts 
did not align with the expected pattern (i.e., highest frequencies in the Agreement-Life 
and Disagreement-Death conditions).  Rather, regardless of agreement or disagreement, 
death was more often recommended in both situations.  Thus, a more likely explanation 
may be that agreement with f(8) [aided prosecution] was simply not related to a life 
sentence.  An intuitive explanation could be that juries interpret f(8) as confirmatory 
evidence of guilt; if the defendant has assistance to offer the prosecution, then he must 
really have committed the offense.  Past research has shown that residual doubt of guilt 
has mitigating value (Garvey, 1998).  If juries treat f(8) as confirmatory evidence of guilt, 
that would preclude the existence of residual doubt as a mitigating factor, thus even a 
larger N would likely fail to produce significant findings relating to the hypothesis. 
Whether Increasing Disagreement is Associated with Increased Death Sentences. 
A follow-up analysis examined whether the effect of the anticipated trend 
increased as a function of similar treatment among all three of the factually asserted 
mitigators.  To restate Hypothesis 3: As disagreement increases across multiple factual 
mitigating factors, so too does the effect size of the relationship between disagreement 
and death sentence.  Thus this analysis examined only cases where the jury was presented 
all three of the statutory mitigating factors of interest – f(1), f(7), and f(8).   
Though it was known that the number of eligible cases for the third hypothesis 
would be much lower, familiarity with the dataset suggested a sufficient number of cases 
among the 369 with juries who received all three of the factors under investigation.  It 
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was hypothesized that, for those juries, their comparative treatment of the three mitigators 
was significantly related to their sentence recommendation.  Whereas the previous 
analyses examined the trend factor-by-factor, this analysis examined the trend in omnibus 
fashion for cases in which all three factors were presented to the jury.  A linear 
relationship was hypothesized whereby juries that disagreed with all three factors would 
most likely recommend a death sentence, juries that agreed with all the mitigators would 
most often recommend a life sentence, and juries findings some but not all of the 
mitigators would fall in the middle.   
The hypothesis was tested using a 2 x 4 Chi-square test for independence, 
comparing sentence (life or death) to the fraction of the three factors agreed with (none, 1 
of 3, 2 of 3, or 3 of 3).  Analysis indicated, however, that increasing disagreement across 
factually asserted mitigators was not significantly related to sentence recommendation, χ2 
= 5.943, p=.051, Cramer’s V =.606 (see Table 8).  The N for this analysis was smaller 
than hoped-for going into the analysis; whereas hundreds of juries were presented with 
mitigators f(1) and/or f(7), only 30 were presented with f(8).  Thus, following the prior 
single-factor analysis of f(8), it became self-evident that this analysis would have an N of 
30 cases at most, but likely less. 
Unlike with the standalone analysis of f(8), though, it seems possible that this 
hypothesis would have been supported by significant findings had there been more cases 
where all three factors were asserted.  Though the analysis undertaken here did not 
closely approach significance, it would have but for the decision to use a Bonferroni 
Correction.  Moreover, though, while recommended death sentences did not seem to 
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align with decreasing agreement, recommended life sentences increased linearly as 
percent agreement with the factors increased.  
Two observations are worth noting in light of this analysis.  First, the analysis 
incorporated fewer cases than hoped for, with guidelines suggesting an anticipated 
frequency of at least 5 cases for each cell of a Chi Square analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007).  Second, the findings nonetheless approached the traditional benchmark for 
significance.  Taken together, these two observations inspired an ad-hoc question for 
analysis: If the inclusion of f(8) in the combined analysis of the factors was preventing 
findings of statistical significance, would removal of f(8) produce statistically significant 
findings aligned with the original hypothesis?  Stated another way, would agreement with 
both f(1) and f(7) be found significantly related to life sentences, and with an effect size 
greater than that of either factor standalone?  Such a finding could suggest that capital 
defendants who are both young at the time of the offense and lack a significant criminal 
history were more likely to receive life sentences when those factors were appropriately 
asserted. 
This ad-hoc hypothesis was tested using a 2 x 3 Chi-square test for independence, 
comparing sentence (life or death) to the fraction of the two factors agreed with (none, 1 
of 2, or 2 of 2).  As newly hypothesized, analyses indicated that increasing disagreement 
across factually asserted mitigators was significantly related to sentence recommendation, 
χ2 = 18.634, p < .001, Cramer’s V =.432 (see Table 9).  Though a linear relationship 
would have been more closely aligned with the hypothesis (i.e. increase in observations 
along categorical increments), the most striking observation may be that, out of the 100 
cases where both f(1) and f(7) were presented, only a single jury agreed with both factors 
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but still sentenced the convicted to death.  Out of curiosity, that case was further 
examined, and it may be further instructive to mention that the case was unusual.  
Namely, the jury in that case found 17 of the 18 mitigating factors presented, but still 
sentenced the defendant to death – a highly surprising outcome in light of prior research.  
This begs the question whether that single observed case is something of an outlier, 
which would further strengthen the remarkable observation produced by this ad-hoc 
analysis.  While the relationship may not be as clean or linear as hypothesized, a major 
implication of this ad-hoc analysis is that juries may be reluctant to sentence a 
comparatively young defendant with minor criminal history to death. 
Whether the Trend is Real (Regarding the Planned Regression) 
Significant findings in the previous analyses suggest that jury reaction to factual 
mitigation is related to ultimate sentence recommendation.  However, those analyses are 
limited in their ability to address whether the observed trend could be better explained by 
other variables.  A final planned analysis adds additional case variables in an attempt to 
flush out whether such confounds do exist, addressing Hypothesis 4: The aforementioned 
relationship will hold when additional demographic variables are added to the analysis.  
The analytic plan called for use of multivariate regression - supplementing the 
three factual mitigating factors with demographic variables historically associated with 
sentence recommendation.  Due to the low number of cases where all three mitigating 
factors of interest were presented, though, that multivariate regression would have been 
underpowered.  However, in light of the ad-hoc analysis examining the combined 
treatment of f(1) and f(7), and noting that 100 cases are available where both factors were 
presented, a logistic regression utilizing f(1) and f(7), but not f(8), would be appropriate.  
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Keeping in mind guidelines recommending at least 15-20 cases for each independent 
variable, regressing f(1), f(7), gender, race, and plea on sentence recommendation should 
be sufficiently powered (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
The results of the regression indicated that the five predictors explained 48.6% of 
the variance (R2 = .236, F(5,98) = 5.80, p < .001, see Table 10). It was found that 
agreement with f(1) [no significant criminal history] significantly predicted sentence, (β 
= .311, p = .002), with f(7) [age] agreement, (β = .287, p = .013), and plea (β = .509, p= 
.017) approaching the p < .01 cutoff for significance.  More clearly non-significant 
predictors included gender (β = .105, p = .698), and race (β = .275, p = .275).  While it 
can be dangerous to draw conclusions from a failure to find statistical significance, a few 
observations are worth making.  First, agreement with f(7) [age] and plea would both 
have been found significant predictors but for the decision to use a Bonferonni 
Correction.  Particularly compelling regarding plea, statistical significance was 
approximated despite only 5 of the 100 defendants having pled guilty.  This suggests that 
plea may bear heavily on sentence recommendation (in all five of those cases the 
defendant was sentenced to death).  Upon closer examination of those five cases, no 
pattern was immediately obvious.  The modest commonality among them might be that 
four shared the aggravating factor that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and 
three shared the aggravator that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel - 
that did not, however, make them unique among other cases in the dataset.   
A second observation worth noting is that the likely reason for non-significant 
findings regarding race and gender are very different.  With gender, as one might expect, 
the failure to find significance may be attributable to the scarcity of females in the 100 
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cases analyzed (97 male, 3 female).  On the other hand, race was not found to be a 
significant predictor despite racial diversity in the 100 cases (55 African American, 39 
White, 4 Native American, 1 Other/Multi Racial, 1 Asian).  However, this is consistent 
with prior research, suggesting that it is not the defendant's standalone race that 
significantly predicts guilt and sentence, but rather an interaction of the defendant's and 
victim's races. 
Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
This study examined the generalizeability of Dr. Laughon's anecdotal observation 
that juries commonly fail to find arguably objective mitigating factors; rather, juries are 
almost equally likely to find, or fail to find, the presence of those factors and that they 
have mitigating value.  Further examination explored whether a significant relationship 
existed between treatment of those objective mitigators, taken individually or combined, 
and a recommendation of life or death sentence.  Statistical analysis of 369 North 
Carolina capital cases suggests that, in actuality, Dr. Laughon's observed trend may be 
even more common than anticipated.  Moreover, in addition to not being able to accept 
the null hypothesis anticipating no significant difference between acceptance or rejection 
of factually asserted mitigators, the observed frequency of juries in disagreement with 
those mitigators outnumbered those in agreement 216 to 180 - an even greater level of 
disagreement than expected.  That said, some significant relationships were found to exist 
between agreement with some of the objectively asserted mitigators and sentence 
recommendation.  Specifically, jury agreement with NC Statutory Mitigators f(1) [no 
significant criminal history] and f(7) [age at the offense] were both found to be 
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significantly related to life sentences.  Further investigation also revealed that the effect 
size of agreement with age on sentence recommendation increased linearly as the 
defendant's age decreased.  Lastly, the strongest predictor of a life sentence was found in 
cases where both f(1) and f(7) were presented, and the jury agreed that each had 
mitigating value - suggesting that a young defendant with relatively minor criminal 
history may fare better than others in capital sentencing proceedings.  
Implications 
Results suggested that objectively asserted mitigators may not be comparably 
found and dismissed.  At first glance these findings may seem unrewarding, but one 
interesting pattern worth note is that instances of disagreement with those factually 
asserted mitigators actually outnumbered agreement by nearly enough to produce a 
statistically significant difference.  Although failing to reach statistical significance, this 
trend is contrary to the unstated alternate hypothesis (i.e., that juries are significantly 
more likely to agree with objective or factually asserted mitigating factors).  Whereas the 
generalizeability of this pattern may be limited, it should be highlighted that with the 
cases investigated herein, defense counsel could not even persuade juries to agree with 
their factually asserted mitigation more than half of the time. 
Finding a significant relationship between agreement with factual mitigator f(1) 
[no significant criminal history] and ultimate sentence recommendation has a number of 
implications worth highlighting.  First and most basically, where the defendant lacks a 
significant criminal history, defense should be certain to advocate this – when applicable 
and agreed with, that factor was associated with more life sentences than death.  Second, 
the converse is also important to note; if the jury may conclude that the defendant’s 
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criminal history is, in fact, significant, then counsel may be cautioned against advocating 
the mitigator – disagreement with f(1) was three times more often associated with a death 
sentence than with life.  Though no causal inference is supported by the analyses 
undertaken herein, intuition supports the idea that juries may punish an overly cavalier 
defense attorney by returning a death sentence. This also suggests, though somewhat 
indirectly, that impression of criminal history or propensity for criminality weighs 
strongly with juries in sentencing decisions. 
Further analyses suggested that, as indicated by the literature, age is a significant 
mitigating factor in capital sentencing (Garvey, 1998).  More interesting, though, are the 
two-part findings that, as age decreased, it appeared that (1) juries were more likely to 
agree with the mitigating factor, and (2) greater weight was afforded to the identified 
mitigator.  These findings have obvious practical implications for practicing capital 
defense attorneys and mitigation specialists; namely that they should be certain to 
advance the defendant’s youth, especially when applicable.  Additionally, through a more 
thorough breakdown of f(7) [age at time of offense] treatment, using age at arrest as a 
proxy, it came to light that in the 100 cases where juries were presented with f(7), they 
more often agreed than disagreed when the defendant was 19 or younger, more often 
disagreed than agreed when the defendant was 19 to 27, and never agreed when the 
defendant was over 27.  This suggests that capital defense may be advised to proceed 
carefully when advancing f(7) as a mitigator in cases of 19 to 27-year-olds, and may need 
to expend extra time or resources establishing why that given age should be mitigating.  
However, neuropsychological research conducted in the last decade (all since the most 
contemporary case in the database) indicates that development of the prefrontal cortex 
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and mature decision making may continue into young adulthood (Hooper et al., 2004).  A 
well-versed expert or mitigation specialist today could communicate such information to 
a jury, thus these observed patterns regarding jury receptivity to age as a mitigator might 
be interpreted as a conservative estimate if applied today.  Though not statistically 
significant, implications nonetheless flow from findings suggesting that juries were more 
likely to proscribe death regardless of whether they agreed that “the defendant aided in 
the apprehension of another capital felon or testified truthfully on behalf of the 
prosecution in another prosecution of a felony” (N.C.G.S.A. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (2010)).  
One possible explanation is that juries interpreted this as an admission of guilt.  Perhaps it 
was interpreted in such a way as to lead to the conclusion that if the defendant was able to 
aid the prosecution he must have had some kind of guilty knowledge.  In light of 
Garvey’s (1998) findings that residual doubt of guilt effectively mitigates, these findings 
could suggest that the converse may also be true; confirmatory evidence of absolute guilt 
may aggravate. 
Although the original planned analysis for increasing agreement among factually 
asserted mitigators may have been underpowered, some implications can be drawn from 
the analysis of the combined treatment of factors f(1) and f(7).  The effect size (Cramer's 
V = .432) for the combined treatment of the two factors was larger than either f(1), (Φ = 
.311), or f(7), (Φ = .270), standalone.  This supports the hypothesized additive effect of 
agreeing with more factually asserted mitigation.  These results suggest that as juries 
agreed with increasing amounts of factually asserted mitigators, there was an increased 
likelihood of recommending a life sentence rather than death. Moreover, as indicated 
earlier, it may be of particular interest to point out that there was only one observed case 
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where juries agreed that the defendant lacked a significant criminal history (f(1)) and that 
he was young at the time of the offense (f(7)) but still recommended death.  The obvious 
practical implication here is that defense counsel would be well advised to advocate these 
facets of the defendant when applicable, as jury agreement with both factors could weigh 
heavily toward a life sentence. 
The multivariate regression indicated that f(1) remained a significant predictor of 
sentence recommendation even with other case variables added to the equation.  
Additionally, f(7) would also have remained a significant predictor, and approached 
significance, but for the employ of a Bonferroni Correction.  That plea emerged as a 
significant predictor, despite its comparative scarcity in the dataset, also brings with it 
practical implications.  The utility of the regression lies in the practical implication that 
minor criminal history, age, and plea will likely hold as predictors of sentence 
recommendation even with great case-to-case variation.  Two main teaching points derive 
from this finding.  First, again, defense counsel should highlight a defendant’s youth and 
comparatively minor criminal history when applicable.  Second, at least in these cases, 
defendants did not seem to get any lenience from the jury for pleading guilty.  Although 
perhaps counterintuitive, this is not wholly in conflict with prior research showing that 
residual doubt of guilt is a significant mitigator.  A guilty plea may, like the presence of 
f(8) [aided prosecution], be interpreted as precluding such residual doubt of guilt, 
removing the potential value of that mitigator. 
Limitations 
The first major limitation is the difficulty of empirically assessing “factual” 
mitigators, and separating those from “opinion” mitigating factors.  The impetus for the 
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analyses undertaken herein was Dr. Laughon’s reported consternation over juries 
disagreeing with or failing to find mitigating factors that, in her mind, she and defense 
counsel had established beyond any doubt.  However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
distinguish from the jury sentencing forms whether the jury: (1) disagreed with the 
asserted mitigator; (2) did not believe that the mitigator was present; or (3) felt that the 
mitigating factor, while true and present, lacked mitigating value.  The forms simply 
reveal either a “yes” or “no” for each factor, so some inductive reasoning was required to 
get from that point to an empirical analysis of factual mitigators.  In the end, as explained 
earlier, the closest approximation became to pick out the most factually based mitigators 
and presume that they were used when applicable.  Admittedly, though, these are two 
leaps of faith.  Throughout this text, attempts were made to pay careful attention to 
presenting the discussion in light of factual assertions or arguments, as there are 
obviously no absolutes.  However, this limitation, though significant, is not deleterious 
for the practical significance of the study’s results.  Regardless of whether a mitigating 
factor is a fact, an asserted fact, an argued fact, or a fact as opined by defense counsel or a 
mitigation specialist, the significant association of age at the time of the offense and/or 
minor criminal history with sentence recommendation can be instructive for future 
practitioners. 
A second limitation is somewhat related, but speaks directly to assessing the 
appropriateness of presenting the jury with factor f(1) [no significant criminal history].  
Although this was identified as one of the more factually natured of the statutory 
mitigating factors, the use of the word “significant” introduces the possibility of case-to-
case variation.  In an ideal world, the criminal files for all of the defendants in all of the 
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cases would have been complete and available, and from this some kind of benchmark or 
standard could have been designed to separate the applicable from the extenuated 
presentations of f(1).  Unfortunately, though, such an undertaking was not possible given 
the available database.  Thus, again, in discussing the utilization and presentation of this 
factor, attention was paid to couch the act as “asserting” or “arguing” to keep this room 
for error in mind.  Nonetheless, despite potential variation among cases, the relationship 
of f(1) agreement and life sentences was found to be statistically significant.  Because 
significance was found despite the potential inclusion of attenuated cases of f(1), one 
could imagine that limiting the analysis to more strictly applicable cases would produce 
findings of greater statistical significance, with potentially an even greater effect size. 
Direction of Future Research 
A variety of future planned analyses are already slated for the database on which 
this project relied.  However, some of those analyses may need to be reconsidered or 
further clarified in light of the analyses undertaken herein.  Also, previously unconsidered 
analyses now seem obvious areas of curiosity and worth examination. 
Through the undertaking of this project, issues of case-to-case consistency and the 
way that may limit sample size and statistical power came to light.  Though it does not 
seem surprising in hindsight, it was unanticipated at the time how quickly the number of 
cases would diminish as additional mitigating factors were added to the analytic plan.  
Specifically, though analyses were sufficiently powered for cases where f(1), f(7), or f(8) 
were presented standalone, by the time the dataset had been cut to only cases that 
included all three, even comparatively basic statistical analysis became somewhat 
compromised.  One of the ultimate analyses planned for this dataset is to conduct a 
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logistic regression, regressing 15 or so mitigating factors on sentence and seeing which 
ones carry the most weight (maximum 15-20 for sufficient power based on 369-case 
database).  Originally, the plan was to utilize the 15 or so factors perceived to have the 
greatest weight based on empirical research or anecdotal evidence.  Now, however, it 
may be necessary to select factors for inclusion based on their comparative prevalence.  
This approach will hopefully maximize the number of mitigators that can be regressed 
together while still ensuring that the analysis is sufficiently powered. 
An additional item for future research, whether inspired or further motivated by 
the present study, is to examine the effects of age at trial on the treatment of agreement 
with age at offense.  Though one can assume that jurors are told that the defendant’s age 
at the time of the offense (sometimes a difference of years in long cases or protracted 
investigations), it would be interesting to see if there is increasing disparity in agreement 
with age as a mitigating factor in cases where the defendant seated before the jury is 
older.  This curiosity stems from the observations noted above (see Table 4) and the 
disparity of agreement versus disagreement with f(7) [age]  in cases of defendants who 
were in their early 20s at the time of arrest.  Had those defendants aged greatly between 
offense and trial, or do juries feel that early-to-mid 20s is an age where moral culpability 
can vary among individuals?  And would updating the database, in light of new 
neuropsychological research on continued prefrontal cortex development, change the 
observed cutoffs?  Additional curiosity surrounding age stems from wide range of 
defendant’s whose mitigation profiles included age as a mitigator (17-68 years).  
Moreover, the uniform disagreement with f(7) [age] in all cases where the defendant was 
27 or older at arrest begs an investigation of defense strategy.  It seems intuitive that age 
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could be a mitigator for the comparatively young or the comparatively old, but for 
someone aged 25-60 at the time of the offense?  How is age a mitigating factor for a 
defendant aged 35 (twice put forth) or one aged 48 (twice put forth)?  Though this may 
be an academic exercise that reveals uninformed or ineffective counsel, it would be 
interesting to see if there is something more under the surface.  
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Appendix A: North Carolina Statutorily Enumerated Aggravating Factors 
 
 
 
 
North Carolina – N.C.G.S.A. § 15A-2000. Sentence of death or life imprisonment for 
capital felonies; further proceedings to determine sentence. 
(e) Aggravating Circumstances.--Aggravating circumstances which may be 
considered shall be limited to the following: 
(1) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.  
(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony or had 
been previously adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for 
committing an offense that would be a capital felony if committed by an adult.  
(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to the person or had been previously adjudicated delinquent 
in a juvenile proceeding for committing an offense that would be a Class A, 
B1, B2, C, D, or E felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person 
if the offense had been committed by an adult.  
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.  
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an 
aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex 
offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful 
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.  
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.  
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of 
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.  
(8) The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement officer, 
employee of the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, 
former judge or justice, prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, 
or witness or former witness against the defendant, while engaged in the 
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performance of his official duties or because of the exercise of his official 
duty.  
(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one 
person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous 
to the lives of more than one person.  
(11) The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of 
conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission 
by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or 
persons.  
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Appendix B: North Carolina Statutorily Enumerated Mitigating Factors 
 
 
 
 
North Carolina – N.C.G.S.A. § 15A-2000. Sentence of death or life imprisonment for 
capital felonies; further proceedings to determine sentence 
(f) Mitigating Circumstances.--Mitigating circumstances which may be considered 
shall include, but not be limited to, the following: 
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence 
of mental or emotional disturbance. 
(3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or 
consented to the homicidal act. 
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony 
committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor. 
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person. 
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired. 
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified 
truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony. 
(9) Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to 
have mitigating value. 
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Appendix C: Illustrative Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Whether factually based mitigators are comparably 
found/dismissed 
  Agreement Disagreement  
f(1), f(7), & f(8) Observed: 180 Observed: 216 
Note: χ2 (1, N = 396) = 3.273, p = .07 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Agreement with f(1) [no significant criminal history] and 
sentence 
  Agreement Disagreement  
Life Observed: 69 Observed: 20 
Death Observed: 53 Observed: 60 
Note: χ2 = 19.522, p < .001, Φ = .311   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Agreement with f(7) [age at time of offense] and sentence 
  Agreement Disagreement  
Life Observed: 25 Observed: 48 
Death Observed: 11 Observed: 82 
Note: χ2 = 12.103, p < .001, Φ = .270 
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Table 4: Agreement with factor f(7) by age of defendant at time of arrest 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Agreement with f(7) [age at time of offense] and sentence, 
defendants aged 27 or younger at arrest 
  Agreement Disagreement  
Life Observed: 25 Observed: 40 
Death Observed: 10 Observed: 62 
Note: χ2 = 10.844, p =  .001, Φ = .281 
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Table 6: Agreement with f(7) [age at time of offense] and sentence, 
defendants aged 19 or younger at arrest 
  Agreement Disagreement  
Life Observed: 14 Observed: 4 
Death Observed: 5 Observed: 5 
Note: χ2 = 2.274, p = .132, Φ = .285 
 
 
 
Table 7: Agreement with f(8) [aided prosecution]and sentence 
  Agreement Disagreement  
Life Observed: 8 Observed: 3 
Death Observed: 15 Observed: 4 
Note: χ2 = .151, p = .515, Φ = .071 
 
 
 
Table 8: Whether increasing jury agreement across f(1), f(7), and f(8) is related to 
sentence 
 
 
Agreement 
with  
0 of 3 factors 
Agreement 
with  
1 of 3 factors 
Agreement 
with  
2 of 3 factors 
Agreement 
with  
3 of 3 factors 
 
Life Observed: 0 Observed: 1 Observed: 3 Observed: 4 
Death Observed: 0 Observed: 4 Observed: 4 Observed: 0 
Note: χ2 = 5.943, p=.051, Cramer’s V =.606 
 
 
 
Table 9: Whether increasing jury agreement across f(1) and f(7) is related to 
sentence 
  Agreement with  0 of 2 factors 
Agreement with  
1 of 2 factors 
Agreement with  
2 of 2 factors 
 
Life Observed: 9 Observed: 27 Observed: 16 
Death Observed: 22 Observed: 25 Observed: 1 
Note: χ2 = 18.634, p < .001, Cramer’s V =.432 
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Table 10: Whether f(1) and f(7) remain significant when demographic 
predictors added 
 Variable B Standard Error 
Standardized 
Error Beta t p 
 
(Constant) -.995 .498  -1.997 .049 
f(1)** .311 .097 .301 3.206 .002 
f(7)* .287 .113 .238 2.546 .013 
Gender .105 .269 .036 .389 .698 
Race .073 .067 .100 1.098 .275 
Plea* .509 .210 .222 2.426 .017 
Note: *p < .05, **p<.01 
 
  
